We argue that the intractable part of the measurement problem -- the 'big'

measurement problem -- is a pseudo-problem that depends for its legitimacy on

the acceptance of two dogmas. The first dogma is John Bell's assertion that

measurement should never be introduced as a primitive process in a fundamental

mechanical theory like classical or quantum mechanics, but should always be

open to a complete analysis, in principle, of how the individual outcomes come

about dynamically. The second dogma is the view that the quantum state has an

ontological significance analogous to the significance of the classical state

as the 'truthmaker' for propositions about the occurrence and non-occurrence of

events, i.e., that the quantum state is a representation of physical reality.

We show how both dogmas can be rejected in a realist information-theoretic

interpretation of quantum mechanics as an alternative to the Everett

interpretation. The Everettian, too, regards the 'big' measurement problem as a

pseudo-problem, because the Everettian rejects the assumption that measurements

have definite outcomes, in the sense that one particular outcome, as opposed to

other possible outcomes, actually occurs in a quantum measurement process. By

contrast with the Everettians, we accept that measurements have definite

outcomes. By contrast with the Bohmians and the GRW 'collapse' theorists who

add structure to the theory and propose dynamical solutions to the 'big'

measurement problem, we take the problem to arise from the failure to see the

significance of Hilbert space as a new kinematic framework for the physics of

an indeterministic universe, in the sense that Hilbert space imposes kinematic

(i.e., pre-dynamic) objective probabilistic constraints on correlations between

events.