%0 Journal Article %J ACM CCS 2021 %D 2021 %T EasyPQC: Verifying Post-Quantum Cryptography %A Manuel Barbosa %A Gilles Barthe %A Xiong Fan %A Benjamin Grégoire %A Shih-Han Hung %A Jonathan Katz %A Pierre-Yves Strub %A Xiaodi Wu %A Li Zhou %X

EasyCrypt is a formal verification tool used extensively for formalizing concrete security proofs of cryptographic constructions. However, the EasyCrypt formal logics consider only classical attackers, which means that post-quantum security proofs cannot be formalized and machine-checked with this tool. In this paper we prove that a natural extension of the EasyCrypt core logics permits capturing a wide class of post-quantum cryptography proofs, settling a question raised by (Unruh, POPL 2019). Leveraging our positive result, we implement EasyPQC, an extension of EasyCrypt for post-quantum security proofs, and use EasyPQC to verify post-quantum security of three classic constructions: PRF-based MAC, Full Domain Hash and GPV08 identity-based encryption.

%B ACM CCS 2021 %8 9/20/2021 %G eng %R https://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3460120.3484567