@article {1590, title = {Designing Incentives for Peer-to-Peer Routing}, journal = {Proc. INFOCOM}, year = {2005}, month = {2005/03/13}, pages = {374-385}, abstract = {In a peer-to-peer network, nodes are typically required to route packets for each other. This leads to a problem of {\textquotedblleft}free-loaders,{\textquotedblright} nodes that use the network but refuse to route other nodes{\textquoteright} packets. In this paper we study ways of designing incentives to discourage free-loading. We model the interactions between nodes as a {\textquotedblleft}random matching game,{\textquotedblright} and describe a simple reputation system that provides incentives for good behavior. Under certain assumptions, we obtain a stable subgame-perfect equilibrium. We use simulations to investigate the robustness of this scheme in the presence of noise and malicious nodes, and we examine some of the design trade-offs. We also evaluate some possible adversarial strategies, and discuss how our results might apply to real peer-to-peer systems.}, url = {http://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~vahdat/papers/infocom05.pdf}, author = {Alberto Blanc and Yi-Kai Liu and Amin Vahda} }