@article {2485, title = {Non-interactive classical verification of quantum computation}, journal = {Theory of Cryptography Conference (TCC)}, volume = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science 12552}, year = {2020}, month = {3/9/2020}, pages = {153-180}, abstract = {

In a recent breakthrough, Mahadev constructed an interactive protocol that enables a purely classical party to delegate any quantum computation to an untrusted quantum prover. In this work, we show that this same task can in fact be performed non-interactively and in zero-knowledge.
Our protocols result from a sequence of significant improvements to the original four-message protocol of Mahadev. We begin by making the first message instance-independent and moving it to an offline setup phase. We then establish a parallel repetition theorem for the resulting three-message protocol, with an asymptotically optimal rate. This, in turn, enables an application of the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, eliminating the second message and giving a non-interactive protocol. Finally, we employ classical non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) arguments and classical fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) to give a zero-knowledge variant of this construction. This yields the first purely classical NIZK argument system for QMA, a quantum analogue of NP.
We establish the security of our protocols under standard assumptions in quantum-secure cryptography. Specifically, our protocols are secure in the Quantum Random Oracle Model, under the assumption that Learning with Errors is quantumly hard. The NIZK construction also requires circuit-private FHE.

}, url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/1911.08101}, author = {Gorjan Alagic and Andrew M. Childs and Alex B. Grilo and Shih-Han Hung} } @article {2386, title = {Quantum hardness of learning shallow classical circuits}, year = {2019}, month = {03/07/2019}, abstract = {

In this paper we study the quantum learnability of constant-depth classical circuits under the uniform distribution and in the distribution-independent framework of PAC learning. In order to attain our results, we establish connections between quantum learning and quantum-secure cryptosystems. We then achieve the following results. 1) Hardness of learning AC0 and TC0 under the uniform distribution. Our first result concerns the concept class TC0 (resp. AC0), the class of constant-depth and polynomial-sized circuits with unbounded fan-in majority gates (resp. AND, OR, NOT gates). We show that if there exists no quantum polynomial-time (resp. sub-exponential time) algorithm to solve the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem, then there exists no polynomial-time quantum learning algorithm for TC0 (resp. AC0) under the uniform distribution (even with access to quantum membership queries). The main technique in this result uses explicit pseudo-random generators that are believed to be quantum-secure to construct concept classes that are hard to learn quantumly under the uniform distribution. 2) Hardness of learning TC02 in the PAC setting. Our second result shows that if there exists no quantum polynomial time algorithm for the LWE problem, then there exists no polynomial time quantum PAC learning algorithm for the class TC02, i.e., depth-2 TC0 circuits. The main technique in this result is to establish a connection between the quantum security of public-key cryptosystems and the learnability of a concept class that consists of decryption functions of the cryptosystem. This gives a strong conditional negative answer to one of the \"Ten Semi-Grand Challenges for Quantum Computing Theory\" raised by Aaronson [Aar05], who asked if AC0 and TC0 can be PAC-learned in quantum polynomial time.

}, url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/1903.02840}, author = {Srinivasan Arunachalam and Alex B. Grilo and Aarthi Sundaram} }